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Side-Channel Attacks Survive Noise Cancellation in 3D Printers

  • Eric Yocam
  • , Varghese Vaidyan
  • , Micah Flack
  • , Gurcan Comert
  • , Judith L. Mwakalonge

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Active Motor Noise Cancellation (AMNC) is a noise-reduction feature shipped in commercial fused deposition modeling (FDM) 3D printers. Because it suppresses the acoustic emissions that side-channel attacks exploit, it has security-relevant side effects, though we find no evidence it was designed as a security control. We present a duration-controlled evaluation of side-channel leakage on AMNC-equipped hardware, using a public dataset of 144 synchronized acoustic and vibration recordings from two Bambu Lab printers across 12 object classes. Spectral analysis confirms that suppression is measurably active: the motor-resonance band rises only 4.92 dB above its background-relative baseline during printing. Leakage nonetheless survives it. Acoustic classification is at chance for 30-second observation windows (11.11%, permutation p = 0.188) but reaches 27.08% on a duration-clean 60-second window and 40.28% when sampling is distributed across the print, against an 8.33% baseline—the channel is suppressed within short windows, not eliminated. The dominant discriminator, however, is print duration itself, which classifies at 63.89% (95% CI [55.78, 71.28]) from recording length alone and is validated against sliced G-code print time at r = 0.907. Vibration carries genuine geometry information independent of duration: with the observation window equalized by truncation, classification reaches 45.83% against a 25% baseline (permutation p = 0.023). It nonetheless adds no measurable information beyond duration in paired comparison. The leak is architecture-specific, present on the core-XY device (36.11%) and indistinguishable from chance on the bed-slinger (13.89%, CI lower bound 7.72%), and a consumer handset recovers as much as a mounted accelerometer (25.00% versus 26.39%). We conclude that noise cancellation raises the observation time an acoustic attacker requires without eliminating the channel, and leaves print duration—the strongest discriminator—entirely untouched. We release all code and analysis artifacts.

Original languageEnglish
JournalIEEE Access
Early online dateAug 25 2026
DOIs
StateE-pub ahead of print - Aug 25 2026

Keywords

  • additive manufacturing
  • cyber-physical security
  • noise cancellation
  • print duration
  • side-channel attacks
  • vibration analysis

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