TY - GEN
T1 - Sensitivity and Importance Measure Analyses for Various Design Architectures for High Safety-Significant Safety-Related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants
AU - Zhang, Sai
AU - Bao, Han
AU - Shorthill, Tate
AU - Park, Jooyoung
AU - Chen, Edward
N1 - Funding Information:
The research activities and achievements documented in this paper were funded by the United States Department of Energys’ Light aW ter Reactor Sustainability Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway. This submitted manuscript was authored by a contractor of the U.S. Government under DOE Contract No. DE -AC07 –05ID14517. Accordingly, the U.S. Government retains and the publishe r, by accepting the article for publication, acknowledges that the U.S. Government retains a nonexclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, worldwide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this manuscript, or allow others to do so, for U.S. Government purposes. Neither the U.S. Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. Government or any agency thereof.
Funding Information:
The research activities and achievements documented in this paper were funded by the United States Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway. This submitted manuscript was authored by a contractor of the U.S. Government under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07–05ID14517. Accordingly, the U.S. Government retains and the publisher, by accepting the article for publication, acknowledges that the U.S. Government retains a nonexclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, worldwide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this manuscript, or allow others to do so, for U.S. Government purposes. Neither the U.S. Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. Government or any agency thereof.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Proceedings of 18th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 2023. All Rights Reserved.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - A transition from analog instrumentation and control (I&C) technologies to digital I&C technologies is taking place for license renewals of existing nuclear power plants and for operating licenses of new advanced reactors. This transition necessitates research on risk and economic assessments of digital I&C technologies to ensure the long-term safety and reliability of vital systems, reduce uncertainty in licensing costs in addition to timeline, support integration of digital I&C systems in the plant, and find the most efficient technology upgrades. Adding redundancy within systems or components is a common means of improving design safety; however, redundant designs are more prone to common-cause failures (CCFs). Introducing diversity into redundant systems or components is a way to mitigate and possibly eliminate CCFs, but it also increases plant complexity and may be costly. The balance between redundancy and diversity remains a challenge for digital I&C systems. This study performs sensitivity and importance measure analyses for four design architectures of two digital I&C systems—the reactor-trip system and the engineered safety features actuation system. For each system, two architectures are examined, including a redundant, non-diverse configuration and a redundant, diverse configuration. The sensitivity analysis will provide insights on the impact of introducing diversity to system reliability. The importance measure results will help identify risk-significant and risk-sensitive components and failure modes, which may be good candidates for future design improvement.
AB - A transition from analog instrumentation and control (I&C) technologies to digital I&C technologies is taking place for license renewals of existing nuclear power plants and for operating licenses of new advanced reactors. This transition necessitates research on risk and economic assessments of digital I&C technologies to ensure the long-term safety and reliability of vital systems, reduce uncertainty in licensing costs in addition to timeline, support integration of digital I&C systems in the plant, and find the most efficient technology upgrades. Adding redundancy within systems or components is a common means of improving design safety; however, redundant designs are more prone to common-cause failures (CCFs). Introducing diversity into redundant systems or components is a way to mitigate and possibly eliminate CCFs, but it also increases plant complexity and may be costly. The balance between redundancy and diversity remains a challenge for digital I&C systems. This study performs sensitivity and importance measure analyses for four design architectures of two digital I&C systems—the reactor-trip system and the engineered safety features actuation system. For each system, two architectures are examined, including a redundant, non-diverse configuration and a redundant, diverse configuration. The sensitivity analysis will provide insights on the impact of introducing diversity to system reliability. The importance measure results will help identify risk-significant and risk-sensitive components and failure modes, which may be good candidates for future design improvement.
KW - digital instrumentation and control
KW - importance measure
KW - Nuclear power plant
KW - probabilistic risk assessment
KW - sensitivity analysis
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85184352602
U2 - 10.13182/PSA23-40957
DO - 10.13182/PSA23-40957
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85184352602
T3 - Proceedings of 18th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 2023
SP - 30
EP - 39
BT - Proceedings of 18th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 2023
PB - American Nuclear Society
T2 - 18th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 2023
Y2 - 15 July 2023 through 20 July 2023
ER -