Security and proliferation risks associated with management of spent nuclear fuel

Globally, commercial nuclear reactors generate roughly 10,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel each year; more than 250,000 tons of spent fuel is currently held in storage worldwide. After removal from a reactor, spent fuel must be cooled in pools for extended periods of time before it can be moved to dry cask storage, reprocessed, etc. In most countries, it will be decades before repositories are available to accept waste in sufficient quantities to begin to significantly reduce the inventory. The lack of functional disposal pathways strains the credibility of the nuclear community and undercuts public and political acceptance for all nuclear activities. While the technical challenges, financial burdens, and political complexities of spent fuel management are well understood, important security and nonproliferation dimensions are often ignored or minimized. Spent fuel contains plutonium - approximately 1% by weight - that can be separated out through reprocessing. This sensitive technology can be used to make reactor fuel or nuclear explosives. Because fissile material production is the biggest hurdle in a nuclear weapons program, the separation and stockpiling of plutonium poses real security and proliferation risks. In addition, the longer spent fuel is stored, the more the shorter-lived 'self-protecting' isotopes decay and the less radioactive it becomes, the greater security risk it presents. In light of some terrorists' demonstrated willingness to disregard their self-preservation in the pursuit of their objectives, the adequacy of the current self-protection standard has been called into question. This paper will describe the security and proliferation risks associated with management of spent fuel and offer recommendations to address those risks.