TY - GEN
T1 - PAVED
T2 - 2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019
AU - Culler, Megan
AU - Davis, Katherine
AU - Sahu, Abhijeet
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 IEEE.
PY - 2019/10
Y1 - 2019/10
N2 - Sensor integrity is arguably the most critical feature to protect in cyber-physical systems. Since power systems are cyber-physical systems with ubiquitous sensors that monitor and protect the grid, data must be trustworthy. Process safety and control decisions ultimately depend on data. The focus of this paper is how to design and apply perturbation based detection for sensor verification, under full AC unobservable false data injection (AU-FDI) attacks, by combining an active probing strategy with cyber-side data based on the cyber-physical situational awareness model CyPSA. A case study on a cyber-physical eight substation model is presented, where we construct an AU-FDI attack and introduce our probing-based detection solution and evaluate it with varying probe signals, values, and locations. Results demonstrate how sensor data in power systems can be systematically authenticated using perturbation-based techniques and how different perturbation types and locations affect the results. The case study then demonstrates the improvements to verification by using both physical and cyber data, as CyPSA provides risk prioritization in the form of authenticity weight measure of the sensors, for enhancing the security of power systems from a cyber-physical point of view.
AB - Sensor integrity is arguably the most critical feature to protect in cyber-physical systems. Since power systems are cyber-physical systems with ubiquitous sensors that monitor and protect the grid, data must be trustworthy. Process safety and control decisions ultimately depend on data. The focus of this paper is how to design and apply perturbation based detection for sensor verification, under full AC unobservable false data injection (AU-FDI) attacks, by combining an active probing strategy with cyber-side data based on the cyber-physical situational awareness model CyPSA. A case study on a cyber-physical eight substation model is presented, where we construct an AU-FDI attack and introduce our probing-based detection solution and evaluate it with varying probe signals, values, and locations. Results demonstrate how sensor data in power systems can be systematically authenticated using perturbation-based techniques and how different perturbation types and locations affect the results. The case study then demonstrates the improvements to verification by using both physical and cyber data, as CyPSA provides risk prioritization in the form of authenticity weight measure of the sensors, for enhancing the security of power systems from a cyber-physical point of view.
KW - Control systems
KW - Cyber-physical systems
KW - Power systems
KW - Security
KW - Sensor integrity
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85076394108
U2 - 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2019.8909800
DO - 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2019.8909800
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85076394108
T3 - 2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019
BT - 2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2019
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 21 October 2019 through 23 October 2019
ER -