Organizational Influence on Supply Chain for Digital Energy Infrastructure: Business Models, and Policy Landscape

Significant investment is driving the essential modernization and digitization of U.S. energy infrastructure, but the United States faces a key challenge in this grid transformation: our renewable and clean energy supply chains have limited capacity to source necessary digital assets through U.S. or allied sources. Batteries and their associated power electronic interfaces are key components to delivering clean and more resilient energy delivery, providing much-needed fast ramping, emergency discharge, generation, and operations support to the electric grid. These services have grown to be invaluable over the past 10 years and will soon be an irreplaceable component of energy delivery. While there have been significant strides to move supply chains for raw and critical materials to U.S. and allied nations, the control and power electronic industry has lagged, in part because of lower cost margins. For example, the United States now has growing capacity to manufacture solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, but 90% of the inverters - which are essential to the conversion of DC to AC for grid connection and controls - are made in or source parts from the People's Republic of China (PRC). While a global supply chain is beneficial for many economic and supply diversification reasons, presence of foreign entities of concern (FEOC) in a dominant role in this supply chain brings additional concerns for national security of infrastructure. The BESS relationship and new clean energy have features that warrant discussions and additional focus on impact for technology security, given their critical role. This review considers the impact and solutions for complex business and policy landscapes in clean energy supply chain, and the benefit trade-offs, focusing on the Battery Energy Storage System case study, and its complex organizational relationships across both the US, Allied countries and Foreign Entities of Concern. While many examples in this paper are presented on PRC focused manufacture, this could apply to any potentially adversarial relationship.