TY - GEN
T1 - Back to Basics
T2 - 18th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 2023
AU - Mortenson, Torrey
AU - Paglioni, Vincent Philip
AU - Boring, Ronald
N1 - Funding Information:
For Vinnie: This research was supported in part by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission grant number 31310020M0002. Any opinions, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this paper belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of the sponsoring agency. The authors would like to thank the A. James and Alice B. Clark Foundation for their support through the Clark Doctoral Fellows program at the University of Maryland. For Torrey: This work of authorship was prepared as an account of work sponsored by Idaho National Laboratory (under Contract DEAC07-05ID14517), an agency of the U.S. Government. Neither the U.S. Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights.
Funding Information:
For iV nnie: This research was supported in part by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission grant number 31310020M0002. Any opinions, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this paper belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of the sponsoring agency. The authors would like to thank the A. James and Alice B. Clar k Foundation for their support through the Clark Doctoral Fellows program at the University of Maryland.
Funding Information:
For Torrey: This work of authorship was prepared as an account of work sponsored by Idaho National Laboratory (under Contract DEAC07 -ID14517), an ag ency of the U.S. Government. Neither the U.S. Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Proceedings of 18th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 2023. All Rights Reserved.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) continues to suffer from a myriad of technical gaps in its foundations. Core issues have been widely discussed but remain largely unaddressed, although the path taken to this point was paved with good intentions. Now, while this characterization may seem dramatic it is not intended to throw doubt onto HRA as a discipline or to diminish the value it has on increasing safety and resilience in nuclear power. Rather, it is intended to communicate that HRA has some serious challenges and is desperately in need of a critical evaluation. To quote Dougherty [1], “the misrepresentations that will undoubtedly arise may serve to provoke the necessary creativity.” What bears noting is that in the last thirty years since Alan Swain declared that “no adequate HRA had ever been done,” there has been little effort to correct the issues he highlighted. Human factors practice is still poorly implemented, many complex systems are fundamentally incompatible with reliable human performance, and there remains poor foundational support for many of the assumptions within HRA. We propose three categories of issues in HRA, philosophical, theoretical, and empirical and potential solutions to these issues.
AB - Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) continues to suffer from a myriad of technical gaps in its foundations. Core issues have been widely discussed but remain largely unaddressed, although the path taken to this point was paved with good intentions. Now, while this characterization may seem dramatic it is not intended to throw doubt onto HRA as a discipline or to diminish the value it has on increasing safety and resilience in nuclear power. Rather, it is intended to communicate that HRA has some serious challenges and is desperately in need of a critical evaluation. To quote Dougherty [1], “the misrepresentations that will undoubtedly arise may serve to provoke the necessary creativity.” What bears noting is that in the last thirty years since Alan Swain declared that “no adequate HRA had ever been done,” there has been little effort to correct the issues he highlighted. Human factors practice is still poorly implemented, many complex systems are fundamentally incompatible with reliable human performance, and there remains poor foundational support for many of the assumptions within HRA. We propose three categories of issues in HRA, philosophical, theoretical, and empirical and potential solutions to these issues.
KW - Error modeling
KW - Human Factors
KW - Human error
KW - Human reliability analysis
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85184353008
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/d679ae85-7957-31ff-8fc9-516e3e14cbda/
U2 - 10.13182/PSA23-41288
DO - 10.13182/PSA23-41288
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85184353008
T3 - Proceedings of 18th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 2023
SP - 52
EP - 61
BT - Proceedings of 18th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 2023
PB - American Nuclear Society
Y2 - 15 July 2023 through 20 July 2023
ER -