An Integrated Risk Assessment Process of Safety-Related Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

Hongbin Zhang; Han Bao; Tate Shorthill; Edward Quinn

doi:10.1080/00295450.2022.2076486

An Integrated Risk Assessment Process of Safety-Related Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

Hongbin Zhang, Han Bao, Tate Shorthill, Edward Quinn

Reactor System Design and Analysis

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems will greatly benefit existing light water reactors. However, the issue of software common cause failure (CCF) remains an obstacle in terms of qualification for digital technologies. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, design flaws could cause software CCFs to become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multilayer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing procedures. In Fiscal Year 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades and designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. This paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI&C systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	377-389
Number of pages	13
Journal	Nuclear Technology
Volume	209
Issue number	3
Early online date	Jul 11 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/00295450.2022.2076486
State	Published - Jul 11 2022

Keywords

Digital instrumentation and control
common cause failure
hazard analysis
reliability analysis
risk assessment

INL Publication Number

INL/JOU-21-65396
105400

Access to Document

10.1080/00295450.2022.2076486

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title = "An Integrated Risk Assessment Process of Safety-Related Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants",

abstract = "Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems will greatly benefit existing light water reactors. However, the issue of software common cause failure (CCF) remains an obstacle in terms of qualification for digital technologies. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, design flaws could cause software CCFs to become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multilayer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing procedures. In Fiscal Year 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy{\textquoteright}s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades and designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. This paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI&C systems at Idaho National Laboratory.",

keywords = "Digital instrumentation and control, common cause failure, hazard analysis, reliability analysis, risk assessment",

author = "Hongbin Zhang and Han Bao and Tate Shorthill and Edward Quinn",

note = "Funding Information: This submitted paper was authored by a contractor of the U.S. government under DOE contract DE-AC07-05ID14517. Accordingly, the U.S. government retains and the publisher, by accepting the paper for publication, acknowledges that the U.S. government retains a nonexclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, worldwide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this paper, or allow others to do so, for U.S. government purposes. This information was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. government. Neither the U.S. government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of the authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. government or any agency thereof. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 American Nuclear Society.",

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N2 - Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems will greatly benefit existing light water reactors. However, the issue of software common cause failure (CCF) remains an obstacle in terms of qualification for digital technologies. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, design flaws could cause software CCFs to become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multilayer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing procedures. In Fiscal Year 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades and designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. This paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI&C systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

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An Integrated Risk Assessment Process of Safety-Related Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

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