A Channel Theoretic Account of Separation Security

Gerard Allwein; William L. Harrison

A Channel Theoretic Account of Separation Security

Gerard Allwein
, William L. Harrison

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

It has long been held that information flow security models should be organized with respect to a theory of information, but typically they are not. The appeal of a information-theoretic foundation for information flow security seems natural, compelling and, indeed, almost tautological. This article illustrates how channel theory---a theory of information based in logic---can provide a basis for noninterference style security models. The evidence presented here suggests that channel theory is a useful organizing principle for information flow security.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on Engineering Reconfigurable Systems and Algorithms (ERSA11)
State	Published - 2011
Externally published	Yes

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title = "A Channel Theoretic Account of Separation Security",

abstract = "It has long been held that information flow security models should be organized with respect to a theory of information, but typically they are not. The appeal of a information-theoretic foundation for information flow security seems natural, compelling and, indeed, almost tautological. This article illustrates how channel theory---a theory of information based in logic---can provide a basis for noninterference style security models. The evidence presented here suggests that channel theory is a useful organizing principle for information flow security.",

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year = "2011",

language = "English",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on Engineering Reconfigurable Systems and Algorithms (ERSA11)",

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AU - Harrison, William L.

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AB - It has long been held that information flow security models should be organized with respect to a theory of information, but typically they are not. The appeal of a information-theoretic foundation for information flow security seems natural, compelling and, indeed, almost tautological. This article illustrates how channel theory---a theory of information based in logic---can provide a basis for noninterference style security models. The evidence presented here suggests that channel theory is a useful organizing principle for information flow security.

M3 - Conference contribution

BT - Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on Engineering Reconfigurable Systems and Algorithms (ERSA11)

ER -

A Channel Theoretic Account of Separation Security

Abstract

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